
ALEXANDER G. JEFFERSON, CDCR #B-99662 / NDOC #48783 Southern Desert Correctional Center Post Office Box 208 Indian Springs, Nevada 89070-0208



Petitioner - In Pro Se:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEXANDER G. JEFFERSON,) Case No.: C 07-4226 JSW (PR)

Petitioner,)

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

-VS-

Respondent.

MOTION FOR A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY (COA)

Comes now Alexander G. Jefferson, the Pro Se Petitioner in the above-entitled Caption, and hereby Moves this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2253(c), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4 and 22(b) and Circuit Rule 22-1(a) for a Certificate of Appealability (COA). The Petitioner seeks leave to appeal and Order and Judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. §2254 petition for Writ of habeas corpus entered by this Court on January 9th, 2008 respectively, and the Petitioner hereby relies upon the holdings of Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521.

This Motion for a Certificate of Appealability is based upon the following:

1.) This Court "Dismissed" the Petitioner's petition based

98

upon the holdings of Johnson v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 964,965 (9th Cir. 1996). Johnson, supra, challenged the validity of the newer 1988 amended vresion of the Parole Board's Regulations, and unlike Johnson, supra, the Petitioner in his petition to this Court did not, nor has he ever during the course of this litigation challenged the validity of the newer amended version of the Parole Board's Regulations nor Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2, nor the Governer's authority granted under either. What the Petitioner did and is challenging is the retroactive application of the newer Parole Board Regulations to him and the retroactive application of the newer California Penal Law/Penal Statute [Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2] to him as both were enacted over an entire decade after the commission of his crime(s) and the retroactive application of both the newer Parole Board Regulations and the newer Califoania Penal Law/Penal Statute to the Petitioner has in fact caused him to serve a more lengthy period of incarceration. Further, unlike Johnson, supra, the Petitioner did assert in his petition to this Court as he continues to assert, that when the Assembly Bill was passed, it was not the California Legislature's intent for Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2 to be retroactively applied; and,

2.) Even if assumed that Petitioner's case here litigated was exactly the same as <u>Johnson</u>, supra, <u>Johnson</u>, is out-dated and inapplicable to the Petitioner's case because long after the <u>Johnson</u> decision of 1996, there was and is a new Rule of Law in effect which holds that the retroactive application of newer amended versions of Parole Board Regulation to prisoners such as in the Petitioner's case at bar, violates the ex post facto prohibitions by both the United States Constitution [Art.1, §10,

C1.1] and United States Supreme Court precedent. See: Murtishaw -v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 966 (9th Cir.2001); Himes v. Thompson,
336 F.3d 848 (9th Cri.2003); U.S. v. Alfaro, 336 F.3d 876(9th Cir.
2003); Hunter v. Ayers, 336 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.2003); Brown v.
Palmateer, 379 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir.2004; William v. Roe, 421 F.3d
883 (9th Cir.2005); and Sanchez v. Kane, 2006 WL 2252640 (C.D.
Cal. 2006).

Under the new Rule of Law, the Petitioner is entitled to be placed under the 1977 version of Parole Board Regulations which was in effect at the time of his crime and not be subjected to the newer 1988 amended version of Parole Board Regulations which includes Gubnatorial Review of Parole Board decisions which is a discretionary scope that did not exist under the Regulations in effect at the time of Petitioner's crime.

The Petitioner hereby assert, that one of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal decisions which the Petitioner has relied upon and cited throughout the entire cousre of this litigation is Himes
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did in fact state a claim in which relief can and should be granted.

3.) As far as Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2, irregardless of how labled, Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2 is an unchangable fact, a Penal Law/Penal Statute and codified as such in the California Penal Code book and when the Assembly Bill was passed, it was not the California Legislature's intent for Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2 to be applied retroactively because 1) the United States Constitution, Art.1, §10, Cl.1 and California Constitution, Art.1, §9 prohibited the Legislature from passing and enacting any ex post facto laws; and 2) the California Legislature Itself has made it very clear in Cal.Pen.Code §3 that "No part of the penal code is retroactive, unless expressly so declared", and Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2 itself is completely devoid of any expression that it is to be retroactively applied.

Furthermore, even if Cal.Pen.Code §3 did not exist, the mere fact of Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2 being absolutely devoid of any language written therein it that even gives a hint that it was Legislature's intent for it to be retroactively, automatically gives rise to the "Rule of Lenity", in which case the United States Supreme Court precedents is absolutely clear in that this issue would have to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner. See:

United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S.Ct. 515 at 522-523 (Note [3,4]), 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971); Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247 at 2252 (Note [2]), 65 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1980). Also see: Pachecoo-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266 at 1271 (9th Cir.2001).

- 4.) If Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2 is labled as "procedural", then clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715 (1990) states that: "Legislature does not immunize a law from scrutiny under Ex Post Facto Clause simply by labelling it "procedural"; Subtile ex post facto violations are no more permissible than overt ones. U.S.C.A. Const., Art.1, §10, Cl.1."; and,
- 5.) If Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2 is labled as a "regulation" or an "order", then the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal in Himes, supra, at Note [10,11] that: "The Ex Post Facto Clause applies by it's term to "laws". As such, the clause reaches "every form in which legislative power of a state is exerted," including "a regulation or order." Ross v. State of Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 162-63, 33 S.Ct. 220, 57 L.Ed.2d. (1913)."; and,
- §3041.2 to the Petitioner is a violation of the ex post facto Clause of the United States Constitution, Art.1, §10, Cl.1, and so is the retroactive application of the newer 1988 amended version of the Parole Board's Regulation to the Petitioner, as both the newer Penal Law/Penal Statute and the newer amended version of the Parole Board Regulations were enacted over a decade after the commssion of the Petitioner's crime and the retroactive application of that newer Penal Law/Penal Statute and newer amended version of Parole Board Regulations to the Petitioner has caused him to serve a more lengthy period of incarcerated.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Petitioner, Alexander

Garcia Jefferson, respectfully asks this Court to enter an Order

certifying the following issues on appeal. The Petitioner

(Hereinafter "Jefferson") proposes raising the following issues

and assement of error:

- A. Did Jefferson demonstrate that after <u>Johnson v. Gomez</u>, supra, that there is a new Rule of Law, holding that the retroactive application of newer amended version of Parole Board Regulations to prisoners violates the ex post facto Clause of the United States Constitution, Art.1, §10, Cl.1 if the newer amended version of Parole Board Regulations causes a more lengthy period of incarceration?
- B. Did Jefferson demonstrate that he is entitled to the benifit of the new Rule of Law which holds that he is entitled to be placed under the 1977 Parole Board Regulations that was in effect at the time of his crime and not be subjected to the retroactive application of the newer 1988 amended version of the Parole Board Regulations which was enacted over a decade after the commission of his crime and is causing him to serve a more lengthy period of incarceration?
- C. Did the District Court error in its failure to apply the holdings of the new Rule of Law after <u>Johnson v. Gomez</u> in this case and dismissed Jefferson's petition based upon the holdings of **Johnson v. Gomez, supra**?
- D. Did Jefferson demonstrate that Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2 is in fact a Penal Law/Penal Statute and that it was not the California Legislature's intent for Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2 to be retroactively applied to prisoners?
- E. Did Jefferson demonstrate that the retroactive application of Cal.Pen.Code §3041.2 which was enacted over a decade

PETITIONER'S VERIFICATION/DECLARATION

I, Alexander Garcia Jefferson, hereby declare pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \$1746 and all other Statutes which covers the penalty of perjury that I am the Pro Se Petitioner in the foregoing MOTION FOR A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, and further declare pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \$1746 and all other Statutes which covers the penalty of perjury, that all the informations provided therein the foregoing MOTION FOR A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, and even further declare that on this ______ day of _______, 2008, I mailed both the original and a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY to the clerk of the United States District Court Clerk pursuant to the "Mail Box Rule" pursuant to Houston v. Slack, 487 U.S. at 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379 on this _______ day of ________, 2008.

Declared By,

00.10.

In Pro Se